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ABSTRACT 
 
Does Education Increase Interethnic and Interreligious Tolerance? 
Evidence from a Natural Experiment 
Christopher Rothi and Sudarno Sumartoii 
 
 
Can the government increase tolerance among its citizens by providing them with more 
schooling? We exploit a large school building program from Indonesia to examine the causal 
relationship between education and attitudes towards people from a different ethnicity and 
religion. Our generalized difference-in-differences estimates suggest that receiving more 
education causes an increase in interethnic and interreligious tolerance. Specifically, a one 
standard deviation increase in education results in a .4 standard deviation increase in tolerance. 
We demonstrate robustness of results and show that the common trend assumption is 
satisfied. Subsequently, we shed light on several mechanisms: first, treated individuals are 
more likely to migrate, to live in cities and to work in occupations outside of agriculture. This 
in turn, increases their incomes and the religious and ethnic diversity of their social 
environments. Second, we employ an additional identification strategy to show that the 
educational content under Suharto emphasizing the national unity of Indonesia is an 
important mechanism underlying the estimated treatment effects. 
 
 
Key words: Racism, Tolerance, Education, Natural Experiment 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Religious and ethnic conflict have tremendous economic and non-economic costs and are still 
widespread today [26]. This is particularly true in the developing world [23], where conflict is a 
major obstacle for development [51, 22, 15, 27]. Little is understood about policies that 
governments can use to avoid religious and ethnic conflict and how to lower prejudice among 
citizens. Attitudes and tolerance are shaped by a variety of factors, such as socialization early in 
life, social divisions and inequalities. Both a theoretical and empirical literature identify 
education as a key determinant of attitudes, tolerance and identity [3, 42, 34]. 
 
However, no evidence on the causal relationship between schooling and tolerance towards 
people from a different ethnicity and religion exists. Moreover, little is known on how the 
effort of the state to positively affect cohesion through moral education at schools affects 
attitudes. While a variety of studies have documented positive correlations between tolerance 
and schooling [42], there are potentially confounding factors underlying these correlations. 
Therefore, evidence on the causal effect of education on tolerance and racism is needed. 
 
In this paper, we study how an exogenous increase in education and the moral education 
under Suharto affect attitudes towards people from a different religion and ethnicity. We use 
several data sources: first, we employ a large Indonesian cross-sectional dataset from 2012 
with attitudinal questions. Specifically, it contains questions on attitudes towards individuals 
from a different ethnicity and religion. Second, we link this with data on the INPRES1 
school building program [25] which is one of the largest school building programs in the 
world. In particular, over the period from 1973 to 1979 more than 60,000 primary schools 
were built in Indonesia. This was a substantial shock to the availability of primary schools in 
Indonesia. The program resulted in an increase in enrollment rates from 69 percent in 1973 
to 83 percent in 1978. 
 
As in [25], we apply a generalized difference-in-differences methodology to evaluate the 
effect of the INPRES program on schooling as well as attitudes. Specifically, we control for 
district of birth and cohort fixed effects. We define individuals as treated if they are born 
after 1965 to make sure that they necessarily were affected by the school building program. 
We interact this treatment indicator with the intensity of the INPRES program2 in a given 
district of birth. In other words, we combine differences in cohorts in exposure to the 
program with differences in the spatial intensity of the program. We find that individuals 
whose educational level was exogenously increased, display higher levels of interethnic and 
interreligious tolerance. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in education results in 
a .4 standard deviation increase in tolerance.  
 
Identifying the causal impact of education on attitudes is challenging due to potential 
confounding factors such as selection biases. For example, more tolerant individuals may 
choose to receive more education [37]. To circumvent these methodological problems, we 
revert to a generalized difference-in-differences methodology by exploiting the INPRES 
school building program. Crucially, the data allow us to test one of the key identifying 
assumptions. Specifically, there may be differential district-specific trends in educational 
achievement and attitudes. 
                                                      
1INPRES means “Presidential instructions”. 
2Given by the number of schools built. 
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To test for such differential trends, we conduct two placebo exercises for cohorts that were 
not differentially affected by INPRES. First, we use individuals born between 1950 and 1960. 
We define individuals born between 1956 and 1960 as “pseudo-treated”. Second, we 
compare cohorts born between 1970 and 1985 and treat those born after 1977 as 
“pseudo-treated”. We estimate a generalized difference-in-differences strategy interacting a 
“pseudo-treatment” indicator with an indicator for high treatment intensity with INPRES. 
We find no significant pseudo-treatment effects. This evidence is comforting as it shows that 
the results are not driven by unwarranted identifying assumptions. 
 
Then, we contemplate a variety of mechanisms that could be underlying the results: First, we 
employ a strategy to provide evidence on the relevance of moral education on the state 
ideology at schools. The main target of this state ideology taught at school was to increase 
cohesion among Indonesian citizens. Specifically, we use the fact that intensity of exposure 
to the state ideology at school drastically decreased with the fall of Suharto. Therefore, 
individuals born after 1988 should not be affected as much by moral education on the state 
ideology. We interact the years of schooling with an indicator for whether an individual could 
be affected by moral education conditional on both cohort and district of birth fixed effects. 
We find that exposure to moral education under Suharto results in higher levels of tolerance. 
Moreover, we conduct a variety of falsification exercises to rule out time-varying 
unobservables as a driver of the results on moral education. 
 
In addition, we provide evidence on the relevance of labor market mechanisms: We show 
that INPRES caused increases in migration to cities, occupational choice into trade and 
industry and increases in income. This migration into cities in turn implies higher exposure to 
individuals from a different ethnicity as cities are much more ethnically and religiously 
heterogeneous and much less ethnically and religiously segregated than villages. Also, the 
increases in income may also result in more pro-social attitudes towards individuals from a 
different ethnicity [36, 24]. 
 
Finally, we rule out a variety of alternative explanations: We show that there is no evidence in 
favor of the contact hypotheses, i.e. we find no heterogeneous treatment effects by ethnic 
segregation [6] at the district of birth. Moreover, we find no evidence that those treated 
display higher levels of well-being or are more sociable. 
 
This paper makes several contributions: First, it provides novel causal evidence on how 
receiving more education affects attitudes towards individuals from a different ethnicity and 
religion later in life. It is thus the first to shed light on the effects of education early in life 
and ethnic and religious harmony. Our paper is the first to provide evidence that these 
effects are long-lasting, i.e. individuals aged between 40 and 50 in 2012 have significantly 
different levels of tolerance depending on their exogenously changed school achievement. 
Second, we shed light on the mechanisms underlying the effects: we show educational 
content per se seems to matter for the treatment effects. Moreover, we provide evidence on 
the relevance of a labor market mechanism: migration from rural areas into cities as well as 
different occupational choices and income increases are likely mechanisms driving the 
treatment effects. 
 
We add to several strands in the literature: first, we contribute to the literature on the 
question whether policymakers can affect children’s attitudes through education [17]. Our 
paper is most closely related to [21], who study the effect of school currriculum on political 
attitudes. In particular, they exploit the roll-out of a textbook reform in China to identify the 
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effect of changes in educational content on political attitudes, such as attitudes towards 
democracy and markets. They find strong evidence that indoctrination worked. In a related 
manner, [56] show that indoctrination under the Nazi regime resulted in higher levels of 
anti-semitism among individuals more heavily exposed to the Nazi ideology. 
 
Moreover, our analysis adds to the literature that identifies the effect of education on social 
preferences [39, 30], political and social attitudes [31], and the effects of education and 
schooling on religiosity [38, 35], secularization [13] and female empowerment [35]. These 
latter papers document that increases in education cause decreases in religiosity and increases 
in female empowerment. This paper is also related to recent work by [50] who shows that 
mixing wealthy and poor students in schools affects social preferences. Further, this paper 
contributes to the literature on integration policies and inter-group attitudes [18, 32]. Several 
papers establish that interactions with randomly assigned peers from a different race lower 
prejudices [18, 16]  
 
Finally, our analysis contributes to the literature on the determinants of racism, tolerance [47, 
42] and prejudice [7]. There is a large literature based on observational data investigating the 
determinants of racism, right-voting behavior and mistrust. One exception is [24] who 
provides causal evidence on right-voting behavior in Germany and economic shocks by 
changes in import competition. In addition, we add to the literature on human capital 
externalities [43]: Growing evidence suggests positive externalities of education on 
citizenship [41] as well as lowered delinquencies [40]. 
 
Indonesia is a very well-suited country to study the effects of education on religious and 
ethnic harmony. First, the country was plagued by major civil wars in Aceh and East Timor 
in the past decades. Second, local conflict that is ethnically and religiously motivated is still 
quite prevalent in Indonesia today [12]. Third, the Indonesian government under Suharto 
made substantial efforts to inculcate its citizens with an ideology emphasizing the unity of 
Indonesia. Fourth, Indonesia is one of the most ethnically diverse countries in the world with 
more than 300 ethnic groups as documented in the 2010 census. 
 
This paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2, we describe the data, the context and the 
identification strategy. Section 3 presents the results. In Section 4, we rule out alternative 
explanations of the results through robustness as well as placebo tests. In Section 5, we 
discuss and test for several mechanisms that could drive the results. Finally, Section 6 
concludes. 
 
 
 
II. DATA, CONTEXT AND IDENTIFICATION 
 
 
In this section we describe the attitudinal data as well as the context. Specifically, we describe 
the INPRES program, the conceptual framework and our hypotheses. Then, we outline the 
identification strategy to estimate the causal effect of education on interethnic and 
interreligious attitudes. 
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2.1 Data 
 
We use data from the socio-cultural module from the social economic survey (SUSENAS) 
from 2012. It contains information on about 70,000 households in total. The dataset is 
representative at the province level. This is the first and only dataset from the social 
economic survey with attitudinal questions that contains information on the district of birth 
of respondents as well as the age of respondents - the two key critical ingredients for our 
identification strategy. The dataset not only contains attitudinal questions, but also 
information on demographics, and education. The two key outcome variables of interest for 
this paper are: 
 
What is your opinion on an activity done in your neighborhood by a group of people which are from a different:  
(a)  ethnicity and 
(b)  religion. 
 
People can respond on a four point scale ranging from (4) “very happy” to (1) “quite 
unhappy”.3 Moreover, we create an index of tolerance based on the two questions through 
principal component analysis. It is crucial to note that this variables could capture two 
factors: it could be that individuals are more tolerant, but it could also mean that individuals 
identify less with their own religion and with their own ethnicity. 
 
In our main specifications we use data from 31,616 individuals born between 1951 and 1972. 
Using data on the district of birth of each individual, we match4 the data on education and 
attitudes with administrative data on the number of schools planned to be built under the 
INPRES program. 5  Moreover, we use data from the 2000 population census to create 
measures of ethnic segregation. Our segregation measure takes values between 0 and .9, 
where higher values indicate that the area is highly segregated i.e. there are many different 
groups in the district , but each group lives in its own sub-district. 0 indicates that the 
composition of each subdistrict mirrors the composition of the district as a whole.6 We 
create the segregation measure by comparing subdistrict-level segregation with district level 
segregation. We match this data with individuals’ district of birth to proxy the likelhood of 
interacting with non-co-ethnics at school. 
 
To shed light on potential mechanisms and confounds underlying the results we also use data 
on social club memberships, i.e. how active individuals are in religious and social 
organizations.7 Moreover, we use data on whether households migrated over the course of 
their lifetime, defined as households reporting not to live in their district of birth. We also 
                                                      
3The four answer categories are given as follows: (4) very happy, (3) happy, (2), not happy and (1) quite 
unhappy. 
4Due to the splittings of districts in Indonesia over time, we use a district-level crosswalk linking district border 
in the 1970s with the district borders in 2012. 
5According to the central planning agency (BAPPENAS) the actual number of school built coincides with the 
scheduled number. 
6If there is only one group in a given district then I re-code the value to one. A completely homogeneous 
district is conceptually very similar to a completely segregated one to test for the contact hypothesis as we are 
interested in an individual’s likelihood of interacting with someone from a different ethnic group. 
7The question is given as follows: Do you usually participate in social activities in your neighborhood in (a) 
religious organizations, (b) social organizations. Answers are given on a four-point scale ranging from (4) always 
to (1) never. 
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make use of data on occupational choice, such as working in agriculture vs. working in trade 
and industry and whether an individual lives in rural or urban areas. Further, we use data on 
general levels of pro-sociality through the willingness to help neighbors measured on a four 
point Likert scale ranging from (4) very willing to (1) not willing.8 Finally, we also use data on 
a measure of happiness on a four-point Likert scale ranging from (4) very happy to (1) not 
very happy. 
 
In what follows, we describe the characteristics of the sample used in our main 
specifications. The average number of schools built in a given district as a part of the 
INPRES program is 265. The mean district population size in 1971 is 518,000. Eight percent 
of our sample have no schooling, about 47 percent are male and the average age of 
individuals is about 49. On average the individuals in our sample exhibit moderately positive 
attitudes toward individuals from a different ethnicity and religion. Further summary 
statistics of key variables can be found in table 1. 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics for the main sample of the main specification  
Variable Mean Std. ev. Min. Max. N 
Tolerance: Ethnicity  2.846 0.519 1 4 28709 
Tolerance: Religion  2.722 0.622 1 4 28147 
Index of Tolerance  0 1.27 -4.496 3.047 27603 
Age  48.775 6.089 40 61 32035 
Number of Schools Built in District (73-79)  265.04 188.433 16 824 31750 
Proportion of villages with “Karang Taruna” in 1983 0.468 0.301 0.01 1 30628 
Proportion of villages with “Karang Taruna” in 1990 0.769 0.257 0.13 1 30628 
No Schooling  0.078 0.268 0 1 32035 
Log Expenditure  14.538 0.728 11.897 18.779 32035 
Male  0.47 0.499 0 1 32035 
Enrollment in 1971  0.182 0.112 0.031 0.993 31491 
Population Size in 1971  518169 406319 12427 1974614 31616 
Ethnic Fractionalization  0.313 0.315 0 0.977 31067 
Religious Organizations  2.814 0.739 1 4 31511 
Social Organizations  2.433 0.879 1 4 29646 
Willingness to help  3.004 0.511 1 4 32035 
Subjective Well-Being (SWB)  2.97 0.511 1 4 32035 
 
 
 
2.2 The INPRES School Building Program 
 
Following an oil-boom in the 1970s the Indonesian government started to increase 
expenditures on development programs. In particular, the government implemented a 
variety of “development programs” to increase equality across different provinces. The 
                                                      
8The exact question is as follows: Are you ready to help others who are powerless (need help) in your 
neighborhood? 
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INPRES school building program, was one of the first and – at the time – the largest 
government program [25]. Between 1973 and 1978 more than 60,000 new primary schools 
were built. 9 It constituted a substantial shock to the availability of primary schools in 
Indonesia. The program resulted in an increase in enrollment rates from 69 percent in 1973 
to 83 percent in 1978.  
 
The aim of the program was to increase enrollment for children not previously enrolled in 
school at all. Therefore, the allocation rule of the program prescribed that the number of 
new schools to be constructed should be proportional to the number of children not 
enrolled in school in 1972. While the initial allocation plan from the government was more 
or less followed, [25] shows that the program was less re-distributive as originally intended. 
 
 
2.3 Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses 
 
In what follows, we highlight several general mechanisms through which education may 
increase tolerance and lower prejudice. 
 
2.3.1 Contact hypothesis and labor market mechanisms 
 
The relationship between education and tolerance, hatred and xenophobia has received some 
scholarly attention. Most prominently, [34] derives a political economy model of hatred. His 
model predicts that education lowers hatred through two distinct channels: first, more 
educated individuals are more likely to differentiate between lies made by politicians about 
minorities and actual facts. One potential mechanism is thus that becoming more educated 
actually makes you more tolerant. Second, he argues that social interactions with minorities 
may increase the incentives to acquire more information about the minorities. 
 
The latter explanation based on the potential benefits of social interactions with members 
from minorities has received a great deal of attention in the social sciences [54, 48, 50]. 
According to the contact hypothesis [9, 48] interactions with individuals from an outgroup 
lower prejudice under a given set of conditions. 
 
Moreover, interactions with members from an outgroup may lower prejudice through an 
indirect channel based on cognitive dissonance [29]. Cognitive dissonance theory claims that 
individuals are likely to change their attitudes on a topic if their actions contradict their 
attitudes. For example, if individuals interact with people from a different ethnicity in a 
peaceful manner, then they may change their attitudes and increase their tolerance. On the 
other hand, it is also possible to imagine mechanisms by which schooling would increase 
prejudice: if individuals go to school in an all one-ethnicity school, group identification might 
increase.  
 
More generally, it may be that social interactions at school affect an individual’s social skills 
and their social capital, which in turn might affect their levels of socialization. Similarly, 
explanations based on identity formation [2, 4] may be a useful guide to understand the 
relationship between education and attitudes. For example, it may be that more educated 
individuals identify less with their own religion and ethnicity, but more with individuals with 
                                                      
9According to the World Bank, INPRES was the fastest school construction program ever undertaken in the 
world [25]. For more information see [25]. 
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the same education or from the same social class. This could decrease the general salience of 
ethnic and religious markers for defining out-group members [55]. If there is a general 
tendency of ingroup-outgroup biases, this could lower prejudice and increase tolerance. 
 
Moreover, there may be a labor market mechanism through which higher education may affect 
tolerance: more educated individuals are more likely to work in a city and thus in a more 
ethnically and religiously diverse environment. Higher levels of education are also likely to affect 
occupational choice, which in turn not only affects incomes but also the social environment. 
 
Finally, more educated individuals are wealthier and have higher incomes. This could directly 
affect their levels of tolerance. In addition, higher income may give individuals access to 
different market opportunities, goods and services (for example travel) that may affect their 
interethnic and interreligious tolerance. 
 
2.3.2 The Indonesian State Ideology 
 
In what follows, I describe one further mechanism through which schooling may affect 
interethnic and interreligous attitudes: the Indonesian state ideology which was taught in 
primary schools. Pancasila was the official ideology of Indonesia under the Suharto regime. It 
started to gain dramatic importance beginning in 1975, culminating in 1985 [45].10 This 
ideology was nationalistic emphasizing the unity of Indonesia.11. This ideology tried to bridge 
interethnic and interreligious cleavages. The first principle of Pancasila encouraged every 
citizen to respect each otherâ€™s faiths for the sake of the harmony and peace of mankind. 
In other words, this principle advocates religious tolerance and freedom of all to adhere to 
the religion or faith of his or her choice [44]. Moreover, Pancasila emphasized the unity of 
Indonesia and was a substantial attempt of social engineering: the program was supposed to 
increase social cohesion among Indonesian citizens [44, 45]. 
 
Between 1978 and 1998, Indonesians citizens spent many hours studying the principles of 
Pancasila. As Pancasila was part of the official school curriculum, students were not 
permitted to progress to the next grade, unless they had mastered its principles. In particular, 
beginning in 197512 moral education on Pancasila became part of the school curriculum [45]. 
 
2.3.3 Hypotheses 
 
Almost all of the listed theoretical channels through which education could affect tolerance 
suggest a positive relationship. Education could increase income as well as the probability of 
migrating. This in turn would affect the diversity of the social environment that an individual 
is exposed to. Moreover, there is a channel based on the educational content that is particular 
to primary schooling in Indonsia in the 1980s: moral education on the state ideology. As 
individuals attending more schooling will be exposed to moral education, we hypothesize 
that they will embrace some of the principles of this ideology. Therefore, we predict that 
exposure to the Indonesian state ideology will result in increases of interreligious and 
interethnic tolerance.  
                                                      
10[45] explains that Pancasila not influential in the first few years of the Suharto regime until 1975. 
11It encompasses five components: (i) A belief in the one and only God; (ii) Just and civilized humanity; (iii) The 
unity of Indonesia; (iv) democracy as well as (v) social justice [44] 
12The intensity of indoctrination and the efforts of the government to inculcate citizens with the Pancasila 
ideology substantially increased in 1978. 
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2.4 Identification Strategy 
 
As in [25], our identification strategy exploits both spatial variation in treatment intensity of 
INPRES and temporal variation in terms of the exposure to INPRES. Crucially, different 
regions and different cohorts benefited differentially from the program. Children usually 
attend primary school when they are aged between 7 and 12. This means that children born 
in or before 196013 could not benefit from the INPRES program.14 The intensity of the 
treatment is increasing in the year of birth until 1971, when the treatment intensity reaches its 
peak and remains constant. 
 
In this paper, we use data on cohorts born between 1951 and 197215, i.e. about 11 years 
before and after the first cohort that could have potentially benefited from the INPRES 
program. In our main specification, we use a dummy variable ܶݎ݁ܽݐ௜ௗ௧ taking value one if 
individuals were fully treated by INPRES, i.e. individuals were born between 1966 and 1972; 
and another dummy variable ܲܽݎݐݐݎ݁ܽݐ௜ௗ௧ , taking value one if individuals were partially 
treated by INPRES, i.e. individuals born between 1961 and 1965. We use individuals born 
between 1951 and 1960 as controls. 
 
Our second source of variation comes from regional intensity of the school building 
program. There were substantial differences in exposure of different regions with the 
program. Importantly, [25] shows that region of birth is highly correlated with region of 
education. This is important since region of education may be endogenous to the INPRES 
program [52, 53], while region of birth is not endogenous as all individuals from our sample 
were born before the first INPRES schools opened. We use the treatment intensity in two 
different ways: first, we differentiate between high intensity and low intensity treatments by 
bifurcating the data by the median treatment intensity. In other words, we create a dummy 
variable, ܪௗ, taking value one if an individual was born in a district with high intensity of the 
INPRES program. In our main specification,16 we interact the indicator for high treatment 
intensity with a dummy variable indicating that an individual could benefit from the INPRES 
program. Second, we also use the intensity of INPRES. 
 
In the simple specification, we include five variables: an indicator for whether an individual 
was born in a high intensity INPRES district, ܪௗ; an indicator for “treatment” and “partial 
treatment”; and interaction terms of partial treatment with the “high intensity district 
indicator”. The outcome variables of interest ݕ௜ௗ௧ denotes the schooling and tolerance of 
individual ݅ in district of birth ݀ part of cohort ݐ.  
 
ݕ௜ௗ௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܶݎ݁ܽݐ௜ௗ௧ ൅ ߙଶܲܽݎݐݐݎ݁ܽݐ௜ௗ௧ ൅ ߙଷܪௗ ൅ ߙସሺܶݎ݁ܽݐ௜ௗ௧ ൈ ܪௗሻ ൅ ߙହሺܲܽݎݐݐݎ݁ܽݐ௜ௗ௧ ൈ ܪௗሻ ൅ ߝ௜ௗ௧ 
 (1) 
                                                      
13In the robustness section, we demonstrate that changing cutoff to 1961 does not affect our results. 
14Duflo uses the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) from 1993 to show that only 3.5 percent of children 
older than 12 are still in primary school. 
15In our main specification, we do not use data from 1973 or after as there are concerns that people might have 
migrated to districts with higher treatment of INPRES schools. In the robustness section we show that our 
results hold if we use observations from 73, 74 and 75 in our treatment group. 
16We choose this as our main specification as it provides a more intuitive interpretation of the coefficients of 
interest than when we use the treatment intensity. All of our results are robust to using the treatment intensity 
rather than the dummy variable. 
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In our generalized difference-in-differences strategy we control for cohort fixed effects, ߚ௧, 
and district of birth fixed effects, ߙௗ. This is pivotal given the possibility of age effects in 
tolerance and preferences [28, 8] as well as regional cultural differences in prosociality and 
conflict in Indonesia [12]. Moreover, we control for population size of the district of birth in 
1971, ܺௗ , interacted with cohort fixed effects. In other words, we control for differential 
trends by population size as it may be that districts with different initial population sizes may 
be on different cohort-trends in terms of enrollment and tolerance.  
 
ݕ௜ௗ௧ ൌ ߙௗ ൅ ߚ௧ ൅ ߛଵሺܶݎ݁ܽݐ௜ௗ௧ ൈ ܪௗሻ ൅ ߛଶሺܲܽݎݐݐݎ݁ܽݐ௜ௗ௧ ൈ ܪௗሻ ൅ ∑  ଶଶ௧ୀଶ ሺܺௗ ൈ ߚ௧ሻߜଵ௧ ൅ ߝ௜ௗ௧ (2) 
 
We prefer this specification with a binary indicator as it provides us with higher power and as 
it facilitates the interpretation of our coefficient estimates. In an alternative specification, we 
use the treatment intensity of INPRES in the district of birth, ܫ݊ݐௗ, rather than an indicator 
variable for high intensity. We interact the treatment intensity with an indicator for cohorts 
that could benefit from the INPRES program, ܶݎ݁ܽݐ௜ௗ௧  and that could partially benefit 
from the program, ܲܽݎݐݐݎ݁ܽݐ௜ௗ௧. The most parsimonious specification using the treatment 
intensity is given as follows:  
 
ݕ௜ௗ௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܶݎ݁ܽݐ௜ௗ௧ ൅ ߙଶܲܽݎݐݐݎ݁ܽݐ௜ௗ௧ ൅ ߙଷܫ݊ݐௗ ൅ ߙସሺܶݎ݁ܽݐ௜ௗ௧ ൈ ܫ݊ݐௗሻ ൅
ߙହሺܲܽݎݐݐݎ݁ܽݐ௜ௗ௧ ൈ ܫ݊ݐௗሻ ൅ ߝ௜ௗ௧ (3) 
 
Moreover, we employ a generalized difference-in-differences strategy using the same control 
variables as in equation (2), i.e. controlling for cohort and district of birth fixed effects:  
 
ݕ௜ௗ௧ ൌ ߙௗ ൅ ߚ௧ ൅ ߛଵሺܶݎ݁ܽݐ௜ௗ௧ ൈ ܫ݊ݐௗሻ ൅ ߛଶሺܲܽݎݐݐݎ݁ܽݐ௜ௗ௧ ൈ ܫ݊ݐௗሻ ൅ ∑  ଶଶ௧ୀଶ ሺܺௗ ൈ ߚ௧ሻߜଵ௧ ൅ ߝ௜ௗ௧ (4) 
 
In both of our specifications we cluster the standard errors by the district of birth to allow 
for arbitrary correlations in error terms at the level of our main variable of interest, intensity 
of INPRES by district of birth [11]. In the robustness section, we show that clustering 
standard errors at different levels and allowing for two-way clustering does not affect our 
results. 
 
We will test for five outcome variables: level of schooling17, an indicator for “no schooling”, 
tolerance towards people from a different ethnicity; tolerance towards people from a 
different religion as well as an index of tolerance. As we will conduct multiple hypothesis 
tests for these different variables that are all conceptually related, we conduct a correction for 
multiple hypothesis testing in our main specification that is evidenced in Table 2. We follow 
the “sharpened q value” approach [14]. The q value controls for the False Discovery Rate, 
i.e. “the expected proportion of rejections that are type I errors” [10]. 
 
                                                      
17Measured on an 8-point scale The eight categories are given by: (1) No schooling to (8) graduated from high 
school. 
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III. RESULTS 
 
 
In this section, we first present the reduced form results from our main identification 
strategy. Then, we employ an instrumental variables strategy to provide estimates on the 
causal effect of education on tolerance. 
 
3.1 Reduced Form 
 
Our identification strategy shows that cohorts old enough to benefit from INPRES from 
high-intensity areas increased their schooling significantly. Moreover, our estimates show that 
treated cohorts from high-intensity regions have more positive attitudes towards individuals 
from a different religion and ethnicity. The results from our simple difference-in-differences 
specification in Panel A and the more restrictive generalized difference-in-differences from 
Panel B are quite similar. 
 
This result holds similarly for our main alternative specification making use of treatment 
intensity of the INPRES school building program. As evidenced in Panels C and D, we find 
that individuals that could potentially benefit from the program in high treatment intensity 
districts display more positive attitudes. We find that the “treated” individuals display 
approximately one tenth of a standard deviation more positive attitudes towards people from 
a different ethnicity and religion. This suggests a large effect of receiving additional schooling 
on tolerance. Importantly, our results are robust to accounting for multiple hypothesis 
testing. Specifically, even after taking account of multiple hypothesis testing our estimates are 
still significant at the five percent level in Panels A and B; and significant at the ten percent 
level in Panels C and D.  
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Table 2. Main Results: Reduced Form 
 Schooling No Schooling Index: Tolerance 
Tolerance: 
Ethnicity 
Tolerance: 
Religion 
Panel A:      
Treatment ൈ 0.715*** -0.055*** 0.133*** 0.056*** 0.049*** 
High Intensity  (0.124) (0.015) (0.039) (0.015) (0.019) 
 [.001] [.001] [.001] [.001] [.002] 
ܰ  31854 31854 27429 28528 27973 
ܴଶ  0.034 0.011 0.003 0.003 0.001 
Panel B:      
Treatment ൈ  0.683*** -0.054*** 0.103** 0.045** 0.042** 
High Intensity  (0.136) (0.015) (0.044) (0.018) (0.020) 
 [.001] [.003] [.023] [.019] [.038] 
ܰ  31616 31616 27203 28301 27741 
ܴଶ  0.014 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Panel C:      
Treatment ൈ 0.0017*** -0.0001*** 0.0004*** 0.0001*** 0.0001** 
Intensity  (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
 [.001] [.003] [.003] [.003] [.004] 
ܰ  31750 31750 27335 28434 27879 
ܴଶ  0.034 0.010 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Panel D:      
Treatment ൈ 0.0023*** -0.0002*** 0.0004* 0.0001* 0.0002* 
Intensity  (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
 [.001] [.001] [.089] [.095] [.095] 
ܰ  31533 31533 27125 28223 27663 
ܴଶ  0.014 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Standard errors clustered at the district of dirth in (). Sharpened q values taking account of multiple hypothesis testing 
through the family-wise error rate adjustment are in []. In Panels A and B we interact treatment defined as as an individual 
born in a high treatment area between 1966 and 1972 with an indicator for high treatment intensity with INPRES. The 
control group are cohorts born between 1951 and 1960. In Panels C and D, we use the same timing definitions for 
treatment and control, but interact the treatment indicator with the treatment intensity. In Panels A and C we control for a 
high intensity indicator and a treatment intensity variable respectively as well as a “treatment” and a “partial treatment” 
indicator. In Panels B and D we control for cohort fixed effects, district of birth fixed effects as well as cohort-fixed effects 
interacted with population size in 1971. * ݌ ൏ 0.10, ** ݌ ൏ 0.05, *** ݌ ൏ 0.01 
 
In Table 3 results on partially treated individuals are displayed. In line with our hypotheses 
we find weaker effects on partially treated individuals both in terms of educational 
achievement as well as in terms of interethnic and interreligious tolerance. Yet, we still find 
some significant increases in tolerance for some variables.  
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Table 3. Partially Treated: Reduced Form 
 Schooling No Schooling Index: Tolerance 
Tolerance: 
Ethnicity 
Tolerance: 
Religion 
Panel A:      
Partial Treatment ൈ 0.457*** -0.046*** 0.091** 0.036** 0.031 
High Intensity  (0.105) (0.011) (0.042) (0.016) (0.021) 
 ܰ   31854 31854 27429 28528 27973 
 ܴ 2  0.034 0.011 0.003 0.003 0.001 
Panel B:      
Partial Treatment ൈ 0.570*** -0.053*** 0.095* 0.035 0.041* 
High Intensity  (0.137) (0.016) (0.054) (0.021) (0.025) 
 ܰ   31616 31616 27203 28301 27741 
 ܴ 2  0.014 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Panel C:      
Partial Treatment ൈ 0.0009*** -0.0001*** 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 
Intensity  (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
ܰ  31750 31750 27335 28434 27879 
ܴଶ  0.034 0.010 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Panel D:      
Partial Treatment ൈ 0.0015*** -0.0002*** 0.0002 0.0000 0.0002* 
Intensity  (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
ܰ  31533 31533 27125 28223 27663 
ܴଶ  0.014 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Standard errors clustered at the district of dirth in (). Partial treatment is defined as as an individual born in a high 
treatment area between 1961 and 1965. For Panels A and B, we interact the partial treatment with an indicator taking 
value one for individuals born in a district with high intensity of the INPRES program. The control group are cohorts born 
between 1951 and 1960. In Panels C and D, we use the same timing definitions for partial treatment and control, but 
interact the treatment indicator with the treatment intensity. In Panels A and C we control for a high intensity indicator and 
a treatment intensity variable respectively as well as a “treatment” and a “partial treatment” indicator. In Panels B and D we 
control for cohort fixed effects as well as district of birth fixed effects. Moreover, we control for cohort-fixed effects 
interacted with population size in 1971. * ݌ ൏ 0.10, ** ݌ ൏ 0.05, *** ݌ ൏ 0.01   
 
Moreover, we interact the cohort dummies with the treatment-intensity conditional on region 
of birth and cohort fixed effects. This allows us to analyze the data as an event study.  
 
ݕ௜௟௧ ൌ ߠ଴ ൅ ߙௗ ൅ ߚ௧ ൅ ∑  ଶଶ௧ୀଶ ሺܪௗ ൈ ݀௜௧ሻߨଵ௧ ൅ ߝ௟௧ (5) 
 
We plot the coefficients, ߨଵ௧, both for schooling, tolerance towards people from a different 
religion and ethnicity as well as for the index of tolerance with and without confidence 
intervals in figures 1 to 8. We illustrate the results in two different ways: First, we plot the 
three-year moving average of treatment effects. Second, we employ local polynomial 
regressions with confidence intervals to illustrate the relationship between year-specific 
treatment effects and birth year.18 As illustrated in figures 1 and 2, we find a substantial 
increase in schooling beginning in the 1960s, i.e. for cohorts that could potentially benefit 
                                                      
18We choose a bandwidth of two years and employ an epanechnikov kernel. 
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from the INPRES program. We find increases in education for cohorts beginning in 1960. In 
line with the assumption of a common trend we find no increases in schooling in the 1950s.  
 
 
Figure 1. Education: MA(3) of the coefficient on High Treatment intensity 
interacted with a year dummy conditional on district of birth and cohort fixed 
effects plotted by year. 
  
 
Figure 2. Education with confidence intervals: Coefficient on High Treatment 
intensity interacted with a year dummy conditional on district of birth and cohort 
fixed effects plotted by year. 
 
Moreover, we find substantial increases intolerance for individuals born after 1962, i.e. 
individuals most likely to benefit from the INPRES program. Figures for all three main 
dependent variables with and without confidence intervals are displayed in figures 3 to 8. In 
line with the hypothesis that the treatment effects are driven by individuals exposed to the 
Pancasila ideology at school we find the largest increases in tolerance for individuals born 
after 1965. 
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Figure 3. Tolerance Index: MA(3) of the coefficient on High Treatment intensity 
interacted with a year dummy conditional on district of birth and cohort fixed 
effects plotted by year. 
  
 
Figure 4. Tolerance Index with confidence intervals: Coefficient on High Treatment 
intensity interacted with a year dummy conditional on district of birth and cohort 
fixed effects plotted by year. 
  
 
Figure 5. Tolerance Ethnicity: MA(3) of the coefficient on High Treatment intensity 
interacted with a year dummy conditional on district of birth and cohort fixed 
effects plotted by year. 
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Figure 6. Tolerance Ethnicity:; Coefficient on High Treatment intensity interacted 
with a year dummy conditional on district of birth and cohort fixed effects plotted 
by year. 
  
 
Figure 7. Tolerance Religion: MA(3) of the coefficient on High Treatment intensity 
interacted with a year dummy conditional on district of birth and cohort fixed 
effects plotted by year. 
  
 
Figure 8. Tolerance Religion with confidence intervals: Coefficient on High 
Treatment intensity interacted with a year dummy conditional on district of birth 
and cohort fixed effects plotted by year. 
The SMERU Research Institute 16
3.2 Instrumental Variables 
 
Furthermore, we use an instrumental variable specification based on the 
generalized-difference-in-differences specification. We do so in order to assess the 
magnitudes of the effect of schooling on tolerance. 
 
In our preferred specification of interest we instrument schooling with the interaction of a 
dummy indicating a high intensity district and a treatment indicator, ܶݎ݁ܽݐ௜ௗ௧ ൈ ܪௗ , 
conditional on both district of birth and cohort fixed effects. The result from this 
specification is displayed in Panel A of table 4. As argued in section 2, the instrument is valid 
conditional on cohort and district of birth fixed effects if the common trend assumption 
holds. I conduct two placebo exercises in section 4 to provide evidence that this key 
identifying assumption is valid. 
 
To test the validity of the over-identifying assumption, we then use two instruments. We use 
a dummy indicating that an individual is born between 1966 and 1969 and an indicator for 
individuals born between 1970 and 1972, both interacted with a high treatment intensity 
indicator. In a third specification, we use the INPRES intensity interacted with a treatment 
indicator, ܶݎ݁ܽݐ௜ௗ௧ ൈ ܫ݊ݐௗ. 
 
All of our instrumental variable estimates suggest that an increase in schooling substantially 
affects attitudes towards individuals from a different ethnicity and religion. Specifically, an 
increase in schooling by one year results in about a 0.15 standard deviation increase in the 
“tolerance index” for all three specifications. This suggests a large causal effect of education 
on tolerance. It implies that a one standard deviation increase in schooling results in almost 
half a standard deviation increase in tolerance towards people from a different ethnicity and 
religion. 
 
Moreover, we examine the validity and informativeness of our instruments. First, we 
investigate whether our instruments are weak: For this purpose, we employ the 
Angrist-Pischke cluster-robust first-stage statistic, which takes account of the non-iid 
structure of the errors [11]. Panels A to C in Table 4 show that the first-stage F-stat is well 
above the critical cut-off of 10. Indeed in our preferred specification in Panel A of table 4, 
the first-stage F-stat is well above 20. Second, we test the validity of instruments by use of 
specification B where we make use of two instruments. This allows us to test for the internal 
consistency 19  of the over-identifying restrictions by means of the Sargan/Hansen test 
statistic: Panel B in Table 4 shows that there is no evidence that the over-identification 
restrictions are violated.  
                                                      
19 The Sargan/Hansen test only allows us to answer the following question: Assuming that some of the 
instruments are valid, are all of them valid? 
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Table 4. Main Results: Instrumental Variables 
 Index: Tolerance Tolerance: Ethnicity Tolerance: Religion
Panel A:    
Schooling  0.147** 0.068** 0.059** 
 (0.066) (0.029) (0.029) 
ܰ  27203 28301 27741 
Angrist-Pischke F-stat  24.70 22.65 26.81 
Panel B:    
Schooling  0.136** 0.066** 0.053* 
 (0.067) (0.029) (0.030) 
ܰ  27203 28301 27741 
Angrist-Pischke F-stat  12.66 11.58 13.67 
Sargan/Hansen test (p)  0.2784 0.6684 0.2095 
Panel C:    
Schooling  0.136** 0.066** 0.053* 
 (0.067) (0.029) (0.030) 
ܰ  27203 28301 27741 
Angrist-Pischke F-stat  19.07 19.97 19.26 
Cohort FE  Y Y Y 
District of birth FE  Y Y Y 
Population in 71 ൈ Cohort FE  Y Y Y 
Standard errors are clustered by the district of dirth. In Panel A we use one instruments: An indicator that an individual 
was born between 66 and 72 interacted with an indicator for high treatment intensity. In Panel B, we use two 
instruments: the first is an indicator that the individual is born between 66 and 69 interacted with a high treatment 
intensity indicator; and the second is an indicator that the individual is born between 70 and 72 interacted with a high 
treatment intensity indicator. In Panel C we use one instrument: An indicator that an individual was born between 66 
and 72 interacted with spatial treatment intensity of INPRES. * ݌ ൏ 0.10, ** ݌ ൏ 0.05, *** ݌ ൏ 0.01.   
 
 
 
IV. ROBUSTNESS 
 
 
In this section we conduct a variety of robustness checks. First, we show that our results are 
robust to including further control variables. Then, we show that our results are not 
significantly affected by clustering standard errors at different levels. Subsequently, we 
provide evidence on the validity of the common trend assumption. We show that the results 
are similar when taking into account of the ordered nature of the outcome variables. 
Subsequently, we show that our results are robust to using different definitions of treatment 
and control. Finally, we investigate the potential confounding factor of missing values and 
conduct a bounding exercise. 
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4.1 Additional Controls 
 
We include data on the intensity of treatment of districts with a large sanitation program 
from Indonesia. In other words, we control for potential confounding effects of this health 
intervention. In addition, we interact the initial enrollment rate in 1971 with cohort-fixed 
effects to control for differential trends by initial enrollment rates. One could argue that 
districts with initially lower enrollment rates had differential trends from those with high 
initial enrollment rates. We find no notable changes in the coefficient estimates of interest; 
there are even slight increases in the coefficient estimates. We take this as evidence that the 
results are not-upward biased as a result of either differential trends or omitted variables. It is 
also possible that our results are driven by district of residence unobservables affecting levels 
of tolerance. Therefore, I have made sure that the results are robust to the inclusion of 
district fixed effects. These results are displayed in Panel H of Table 5. Finally, there are 
some concerns regarding the data quality in Papua. Therefore, I show that my results are not 
driven by the subsample from Papua. Indeed as can be seen in Panel I of Table 5, my 
estimated coefficient estimates even slightly increase once I exclude Papua. 
 
Moreover, we take account of the ordered nature of the two attitudinal variables. In other 
words, we employ exactly the same identification strategy as in our main reduced form 
specification, but employ an ordered logit model. Thus, we can relax the equidistance 
assumption underlying the OLS estimates: these estimates implicitly rely on the assumption 
that, for example, the difference between 1 (“quite unhappy”) and 2 (“unhappy”) and 3 
(“happy”) and 4 (“very happy”) is equivalent. As can be seen in Panel G of Table 4, our main 
results are robust to taking account of the non-linear nature of the dependent variable. 
 
 
4.2 Standard Errors 
 
Our results are robust to clustering standard errors in a variety of different ways. First, we 
cluster the standard errors by current district of residence as evidenced in Table 4 Panel C. 
Second, we cluster standard errors by the birth cohort as we might be concerned that there is 
correlation of error terms for people born in the same cohort. As we only consider 22 
cohorts in our main specification, we apply a wild-cluster bootstrap correction of standard 
errors in order to avoid over-rejection of the null hypothesis [11, 20, 19]. 
 
Moreover, we take account of potential correlation in errors in different non-nested clusters 
by employing two-way clustering methods [19]. Specifically, we two-way cluster standard 
errors by district of birth and district of residence as can be seen in Panel E. Finally, as 
illustrated in Panel F, we employ two-way clustering by district of birth and cohort. The 
standard errors barely change as a result of two-way clustering. All in all, the small changes of 
standard errors for different levels of clusters is comforting evidence for valid inference.  
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Table 5. Robustness of the main results 
 Schooling No Schooling
Index: 
Tolerance 
Tolerance: 
Ethnicity 
Tolerance: 
Religion 
Panel A Main Specifciation.      
Treatment ൈ  0.683***   -0.054***   0.103**   0.045**   0.042**  
High Intensity   (0.136)   (0.015)   (0.044)   (0.018)   (0.020)  
ܰ   31616   31616   27203   28301   27741  
Panel B: With Controls      
Treatment ൈ  0.666***   -0.049***   0.101**   0.044**   0.041**  
High Intensity   (0.138)   (0.016)   (0.045)   (0.018)   (0.021)  
ܰ   30579   30579   26249   27319   26781  
Panel C: Cluster: Cohort      
Treatment ൈ  0.683***   -0.054***   0.103**   0.045**   0.042**  
High Intensity   (0.122)   (0.013)   (0.044)   (0.018)   (0.021)  
ܰ   31616   31616   27203   28301   27741  
Panel D: Cluster: Current district      
Treatment ൈ  0.683***   -0.054***   0.103**   0.045**   0.042**  
High Intensity   (0.073)   (0.007)   (0.043)   (0.019)   (0.019)  
ܰ   31616   31616   27203   28301   27741  
Panel E: Two-way Cluster A      
Treatment ൈ  0.683***   -0.054***   0.103**   0.045**   0.042**  
High Intensity   (0.136)   (0.015)   (0.044)   (0.018)   (0.020)  
ܰ   31616   31616   27203   28301   27741  
Panel F: Two-way Cluster B      
Treatment ൈ  0.683***   -0.054***   0.103**   0.045**   0.042**  
High Intensity   (0.120)   (0.014)   (0.042)   (0.018)   (0.017)  
ܰ   31616   31616   27203   28301   27741  
Panel G: Ordered Model      
Treatment ൈ  0.440***   -   -   0.191**   0.156*  
High Intensity   (0.098)   -   -   (0.085)   (0.080)  
Panel H: Current Districts FE      
Treatment ൈ  0.668***   -0.052***   0.105**   0.049***   0.040*  
High Intensity   (0.121)   (0.014)   (0.045)   (0.018)   (0.021)  
Panel H: without Papua      
Treatment ൈ  0.670***   -0.052***   0.100**   0.044**   0.041*  
High Intensity   (0.120)   (0.014)   (0.046)   (0.019)   (0.022)  
Cohort FE   Y   Y   Y   Y   Y 
District of birth FE   Y   Y   Y   Y   Y 
Population in 71 ൈ Cohort FE   Y   Y   Y   Y   Y 
ܰ   31616   28301   27203   28301   27741  
Standard errors are clustered at the district of birth unless otherwise specified. In Panel B we control for intensity of a 
health and sanitation program and enrolment rates, both interacted with cohort dummies. we Panel C we cluster standard 
errors by cohort and in D by current residence district. In Panel E we two-way cluster standard errors at the district of 
residence and district of birth. In Panel F we two-way cluster standard errors by cohort and district of birth. In Panel G we 
use an ordered logit model to take account of the ordinal nature of the outcome variables of interest. In Panel H I include 
both district of residence and district of birth fixed effects. * ݌ ൏ 0.10, ** ݌ ൏ 0.05, *** ݌ ൏ 0.01 
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4.3 The Common Trend Assumption 
 
We test whether the key identification assumption of a common trend in schooling and 
attitudes is valid. Specifically, we conduct two placebo tests for cohorts not differentially 
affected by INPRES. First, we use individuals born between 1950 and 1960. All of these 
individuals already should have left primary school by the time the first INPRES school was 
built. We create a pseudo-treatment indicator for individuals born between 1956 and 1960. 
We interact the pseudo-treatment indicator with a dummy variable indicating high INPRES 
treatment intensity20 and control for cohort and district of birth fixed effects. 
 
Second, we use data on individuals born between 1973 and 1985, i.e. cohorts that all should 
benefit from the INPRES program. We create a pseudo-treatment variable for those born 
after 1979. Then, we interact this pseudo-treatment indicator with a dummy variable 
indicating high treatment intensity. If the assumption of a common trend in schooling and 
interethnic and interreligious attitudes is valid, we would expect there to be no significant 
treatment effects in this placebo specification. As is evidenced in Panels A and B of table 5, 
this is exactly what we find in the data. None of the “pseudotreatment” coefficients is 
significantly different from zero; 6 out of the 10 tested coefficients are negative, providing 
further credibility to the common trend assumption.  
 
Table 6. Common trend assumption 
 Schooling No Schooling Index: Tolerance Tolerance: Ethnicity 
Tolerance: 
Religion 
Panel A      
Pseudotreatment ൈ 0.0432 -0.0056 0.0299 -0.0037 0.0266 
High Intensity  (0.1604) (0.0175) (0.0730) (0.0280) (0.0362) 
ܰ  11851 11851 10085 10526 10301 
Sample B      
Pseudotreatment ൈ 0.0403 -0.0000 -0.0376 -0.0081 -0.0205 
High Intensity  (0.0675) (0.0051) (0.0493) (0.0193) (0.0245) 
ܰ  24226 24226 20941 21751 21326 
Standard Error clustered at the district of birth in parentheses. In Panel A we interact a pseudo-treatment dummy indicator 
(for cohorts born between 56 and 60) with a dummy indicating high treatment intensity. The control group in Panel A are 
cohorts born between 50 and 55. For Panel B we interact a pseudo-treatment dummy indicator (for cohorts born between 
79 and 85) with a dummy indicating high treatment intensity. The control group in Panel B are cohorts born between 73 
and 78.* ݌ ൏ 0.10, ** ݌ ൏ 0.05, *** ݌ ൏ 0.01.   
 
 
4.4 Different Definitions for Treatment and Control 
 
We show that our results are robust to using different definitions of treatment and control. 
We demonstrate that the results are quite robust to using different cutoffs for the treatment 
definitions – which is also clearly evidenced in figures 1 to 8 where we plot the “treatment 
effects” for every year individually. Using cohorts born in 1961 in the control group does not 
significantly affect our estimates. This can be seen in Table 7, Panel B. In Panels C and D, we 
use different definitions of treatment. Specifically, we show that including individuals born in 
                                                      
20Results from this placebo exercise are very similar when using treatment intensity. 
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1973 (Panel C) and between 1973 and 1975 (Panel D) in the treatment group does not 
significantly affect results. Indeed, the coefficient estimates seem to increase slightly. Overall, 
the robustness of coefficient estimates provides further credibility to the estimated treatment 
effects.  
 
Table 7. Sample Definitions: Robustness 
 Schooling No Schooling Index: Tolerance
Tolerance: 
Ethnicity 
Tolerance: 
Religion 
Panel A Main Specification.      
Treatment ൈ 0.683*** -0.054*** 0.103** 0.045** 0.042** 
High Intensity  (0.136) (0.015) (0.044) (0.018) (0.020) 
ܰ  31616 31616 27203 28301 27741 
ܴଶ  0.014 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Sample B      
Treatment ൈ 0.630*** -0.048*** 0.096** 0.044*** 0.036* 
High Intensity  (0.130) (0.014) (0.042) (0.017) (0.020) 
ܰ  31616 31616 27203 28301 27741 
ܴଶ  0.014 0.007 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Sample C      
Treatment ൈ 0.702*** -0.056*** 0.101** 0.041** 0.045** 
High Intensity  (0.136) (0.016) (0.043) (0.018) (0.020) 
ܰ  33584 33584 28911 30062 29489 
ܴଶ  0.016 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Sample D      
Treatment ൈ 0.748*** -0.059*** 0.111*** 0.048*** 0.044** 
High Intensity  (0.137) (0.016) (0.042) (0.017) (0.020) 
ܰ  37728 37728 32498 33780 33138 
ܴଶ  0.019 0.010 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Standard Error clustered at the district of birth in parentheses. In Panel A we report the main specification. In Panel B, we 
include 1961 cohort as a control year. In Panel C we include 1973 as a treatment year. In Panel D we include cohorts born 
1973 - 1975 in the treatment group. 
 
 
4.5 Missings and Partial Identification 
 
About 14 percent of our sample have missing values for the question on tolerance. We 
investigate whether treated individuals are more likely to have missing values. As is evidenced 
in Table 8, treated individuals receiving more education are more likely to respond to the 
question. One interpretation is that individuals with more education have less difficulties in 
understanding the question, and are therefore more likely to reply to the question. Yet, there 
is a second interpretation: Not responding to the question may be a sign of negative attitudes 
towards individuals from a different ethnicity and religion if we are willing to assume that 
individuals experience a disutility in expressing negative inter-ethnic and inter-religious 
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attitudes.21 If we assume that those individuals who refused to answer the question have a 
less positive attitude towards people from a different ethnicity, then this would imply that 
our estimates are downward biased, i.e. that the true population “treatment effect” of interest 
is larger than the estimates from our main specification. 
 
To investigate the sensitivity of our results to these missing values we conduct a 
partial-identification exercise. We bound our estimated effects as follows: First, we set all 
of the missings to the highest (lower bound of the estimate) and then to the lowest 
possible value (upper bound of the estimate). Table 8 shows that these bounds range from 
ca. 0.07 to 0.01 for both outcome variables of interest. Given that people might experience 
disutility from expressing a negative attitude towards people from a different ethnicity, 
those might be more likely not to respond. This would imply that the “true treatment 
effects” are closer to the upper rather than the lower bounds given by this partial 
identification exercise given that we find that less educated individuals are less likely to 
respond. 
 
Table 8. Missings and Partial Identification 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Missing: Tolerance Upper Bound: Tolerance Lower Bound: Tolerance 
 Ethnicity Religion Ethnicity Religion Ethnicity Religion 
Treatment ൈ -0.017 -0.022* 0.069*** 0.073*** 0.019 0.008 
High Intensity  (0.011) (0.012) (0.024) (0.026) (0.022) (0.025) 
ܰ  31616 31616 31616 31616 31616 31616 
ܴଶ  0.096 0.107 0.100 0.158 0.047 0.062 
Standard errors clustered at the district of birth in parentheses. In columns (1) and (2), results on the probability of missing 
values of the two tolerance questions are reported. In columns (3) and (4) we set all of the missing values to the lowest 
possible value (1). In columns (5) and (6) we set all of the missing values to the highest possible value (4).   
 
 
 
V. MECHANISMS AND HETEROGENEITY 
 
 
In this section we analyze potential mechanisms underlying the estimated effect of education. 
First, we show that moral education on the state ideology under Suharto is a key mechanism 
underlying the results. Then we investigate several further mechanisms, such as migration, 
occupational choice and income effects. Finally, we rule out alternative explanations based 
on general pro-sociality, socialization and well-being. 
 
 
5.1 Pancasila Moral Education 
 
In what follows we investigate whether the educational content, i.e. Pancasila moral 
education, is important for the estimated relationship between schooling and tolerance. 
Specifically, we compare differences in differences between individuals with schooling and 
                                                      
21Clearly, this is also reliant on the assumption of substantial lying costs [1] 
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whether they were born before 1988. Those born in or after 1988 would only be slightly or 
not at all affected by the Suharto regime’s attempts for indoctrination in primary schools.22 
 
Specifically, as Suharto fell in 1998 only those born before 1985 would still be indoctrinated 
with Pancasila during their whole education at primary school. Those born between 1985 and 
1987 would be partially treated; and those born in or after 1988 would only be marginally 
treated or not treated at all. To identify the effect of changes in educational content as a 
result of the Suharto regime, we employ the following strategy: we use variation in schooling 
as well as temporal variation to differentiate between individuals born before or after 1988. 
 
Specifically, we create a treatment indicator ܴܶ௜ௗ௧ for individuals born before 1985 and after 
1973, a partial treatment indicator for individuals born between 1985 and 1987, ܴܲܶ௜ௗ௧ and 
interact these with a variable indicating the amount of schooling, ܵܥ௜ௗ. We employ a strategy 
controlling for district of birth23, ߙௗ, and cohort fixed effects, ߚ௧.  
 
ݕ௜ௗ௧ ൌ ߨଵሺܴܶ௜ௗ௧ ൈ ܵܥ௜ௗሻ ൅ ߨଶሺܴܲܶ௜ௗ௧ ൈ ܵܥ௜݀ሻ ൅ ߨଷܵܥ௜ௗ ൅ ߙௗ ൅ ߚ௧ ൅ ߝ௜ௗ௧ (6) 
 
We cluster the standard errors at the district-of birth level and have made sure that the results 
are robust to clustering at different levels. Table 11 presents the results: we find that those 
with higher levels of education born before 1985 and 1989 respectively display significantly 
higher levels of tolerance towards people from a different ethnicity and religion. This 
provides further evidence for the importance of educational content under Suharto, i.e. 
Pancasila moral education, as a mechanism underlying the estimated treatment effects. 
 
One could argue that those with low schooling born in 1989 differ substantially from those 
with low schooling born in 1973. One could argue that comparing those born between 1985 
and 1988 with those born after that should address concern of time-varying unobservables of 
those with low schooling. In other words, one can compare those individuals born within a 
time window of a few years and interpret the results in the spirit of a regression discontinuity 
design. As can be seen in Table 11, our results are robust for those individuals that were 
partially treated, i.e. born between 85 and 88 (inclusive). Indeed, the estimated treatment 
effects are quite similar for partially vs. fully treated individuals. 
 
In addition, we conduct two placebo exercises to address further caveats regarding 
time-varying unobservables of individuals with low levels of schooling. Specifically, we use 
individuals born between 1950 and 1960 (individuals not affected by Pancasila) and define 
those born between 1956 and 1960 as “pseudo-treated”. We interact the pseudo-treatment 
indicator with the schooling variable. As can be seen in Panel B of Table 10. We find no 
treatment effects. Finally, we use individuals born between 1970 and 1979 (all similarly 
affected by Pancasila moral education at schools) to conduct a further placebo. We use those 
born after 1975 as “pseudo-treated” and interact this indicator with the years of schooling. 
Panel C of Table 10 shows that we find no treatment effects for this falsification exercise.  
                                                      
22It should be noted that a certain much less pronounced and intensive form of Pancasila moral education is 
still taught in schools in Indonesia today. It enjoys a much lower importance than in the Suharto period. 
23The results are robust to controlling for district of residence rather than district of birth. 
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Table 9. Pancasila Moral Education 
 Index: Tolerance 
Tolerance: 
Ethnicity 
Tolerance: 
Religion 
Panel A    
Treatment ൈ 0.032*** 0.011*** 0.016*** 
Schooling  (0.010) (0.004) (0.005) 
Partial Treatment ൈ 0.032** 0.009 0.015*** 
Schooling  (0.013) (0.005) (0.006) 
ܰ  27031 28099 27511 
Panel B: Placebo 1    
Pseudo-treatment ൈ -0.005 -0.001 -0.004 
Schooling  (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) 
ܰ  10147 10588 10364 
Panel C: Placebo 2    
Pseudo-treatment ൈ -0.008 -0.001 -0.004 
Schooling  (0.010) (0.004) (0.005) 
ܰ  17527 18178 17864 
District of birth FE  Y Y Y 
Cohort FE  Y Y Y 
ܰ  27031 28099 27511 
ܴଶ  0.106 0.067 0.130 
Standard Error clustered at the district of birth in parentheses. The fully treated individuals are 
defined as those born between 1973 and 1984. The partially treated individuals are those born 
between 1985 and 1987. The control individuals are those born after 1988. * ݌ ൏ 0.10, ** ݌ ൏ 0.05, 
*** ݌ ൏ 0.01.   
 
 
5.2 Labor market mechanisms and income effects 
 
The availability of primary education may substantially affect individual’s life in terms of 
occupational choice, migration into cities and earned income. First, we look into the effects 
of INPRES on occupational choice. We find that those individuals with exogenously 
increased levels of education are more likely to work in trade and industry and less likely to 
work in agriculture. Moreover, “treated individuals” are more likely to migrate24, and to live 
in cities. This in turn has dramatic consequences on individual’s social environment as they 
are exposed to a higher degree of ethnic and religious heterogeneity. 
 
Moreover, treated individuals have have higher total expenditures. It may be that this 
increase in expenditures affects individuals preferences: first, it may be that there is a direct 
link between income and tolerance. Second, it may be that the opportunities brought about 
by an increase in income, for example travel, affect tolerance and social preferences. This 
mechanism is in line with [24]. They show that negative exogenous economic shocks result in 
more right wing voting in Germany. 
                                                      
24Here, we employ the following definition of migration: the dummy migration takes value one if an individual 
currently does not live in the district in which he or she was born. This variables is noisily measured as it does 
not capture within-district migration and it does not account for multiple migrations. 
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Table 10. Labor Market Mechanisms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Log 
Expenditure 
Migration Agriculture Industry Trade Employee Rural 
Panel A:        
Treatment ൈ 0.033* 0.753* -0.025* 0.026*** 0.021* 0.008 -0.032*** 
High Intensity  (0.019) (0.416) (0.013) (0.008) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
ܰ  32035 32035 24017 24017 24017 24017 32035 
Panel B:        
Treatment ൈ 0.000*** 0.002* -0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** 
Intensity  (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ܰ  31750 31750 23787 23787 23787 23787 31750 
Standard errors clustered at the district of birth in parentheses. In columns (3) to (6) we only consider individuals currently 
in the labor market. * ݌ ൏ 0.10, ** ݌ ൏ 0.05, *** ݌ ൏ 0.01.   
 
 
5.3 Alternative Mechanisms 
 
In this subsection, we examine alternative mechanisms that could be driving the treatment 
effects. We investigate how the treatment affects several variables that might constitute 
alternative mechanisms underlying the effects on tolerance. Finally, we analyze 
heterogeneous effects of INPRES by the ethnic segregation of the district of birth. 
 
It might be that individuals that are more educated are generally happier, more pro-social and 
more sociable. [49] have recently pointed out that it is more powerful to use noisily measured 
potential confounding variables on the left-hand side of the candidate equation rather than 
including them as ‘endogenous controls’ in the main specification. Therefore, we employ our 
main generalized difference-in-differences specifications (both based on intensity and one 
based on a high intensity dummy) to investigate the effect of INPRES on (i) social club 
memberships, (ii) willingness to help neighbors and (iii) happiness.25 
 
It could be that individuals with higher levels of education acquire skills of socializations as a 
result of higher levels of schooling. In other words, in addition to human capital they might 
build up social capital. To test for this particular mechanism, I examine whether individuals 
with higher levels of schooling join more social and religious organizations. As can be seen in 
table 11, we find no evidence that those individuals affected by INPRES increase their 
activities in religious and social organizations. The estimated treatment effect is not 
statistically significant. 
 
Second, recent evidence by [39] suggests that education has a causal impact on social 
preferences. Therefore, we investigate whether schooling might have increased pro-social 
attitudes more generally. For this purpose we investigate the effect of receiving more 
education on willingness to help neighbors and to share with neighbors. We find no evidence 
for in favor of this particular mechanism. 
 
                                                      
25We have made sure that our results are similar for an alternative measure of mental health. 
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Third, it could be hypothesized that higher income and the resulting increase in well-being 
and reduction in anxiety of potentially losing a job, could reduce racism. We find no evidence 
for this mechanism: specifically, our estimates suggest that the treated group does not display 
higher levels of well-being.  
 
Table 11. Alternative Mechanisms 
 Willingness to help 
Mutual 
Support 
Religious 
Organization 
Social 
Organization SWB 
Panel A:      
Treatment ൈ 0.004 -0.021 0.006 0.008 0.008 
High Intensity  (0.013) (0.018) (0.020) (0.024) (0.013) 
ܰ  32035 32035 31511 29646 32035 
Panel B:      
Treatment ൈ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
Intensity  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ܰ  31750 31750 31234 29387 31750 
Standard errors clustered at the district of birth in parentheses 
* ݌ ൏ 0.10, ** ݌ ൏ 0.05, *** ݌ ൏ 0.01 
 
Furthermore, there might be a direct socialization mechanism through which education 
could affect interethnic and interreligious attitudes: specifically, attendance of primary school 
might expose individuals to interactions with individuals from a different ethnicity and 
religion [48]. To test whether interactions with individuals from a different ethnicity are an 
important mechanism in this context, we make use of a measure of ethnic segregation [6]. 
Specifically, we conduct a median-split by ethnic segregation in order to assess treatment 
heterogeneity. We find that the treatment effects are very similar for individuals born in high 
ethnic segregation districts vs. low ethnic segregation districts. Therefore, we can rule out an 
explanation based on the contact hypothesis based on our data. 
 
Table 12. Heterogeneity by ethnic segregation of district of birth 
 Schooling No Schooling Index of Prejudice 
High Ethnic Segregation  yes no yes no yes no 
Treatment  0.774*** 0.523*** -0.053*** -0.053** 0.085 0.120* 
 (0.173) (0.194) (0.020) (0.024) (0.058) (0.067) 
P-value of difference  0.363 0.903 0.717 
ܰ  15960 14876 15960 14876 13451 13100 
ܴଶ  0.013 0.020 0.009 0.009 0.002 0.002 
  Tolerance: Ethnicity Tolerance: Religion  
High Ethnic Segregation    yes no yes no  
Treatment    0.044* 0.048* 0.026 0.053*  
   (0.024) (0.027) (0.027) (0.031)  
P-value   0.890 0.569  
ܰ    13947 13677 13819 13270  
Standard errors clustered at the district of birth in parentheses. Here, we conduct a median split method and split the 
sample by the median level of ethnic segregation (in which the segregation index takes value .25) in an individual’s district 
of birth. * ݌ ൏ 0.10, ** ݌ ൏ 0.05, *** ݌ ൏ 0.01.   
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
 
This paper is the first to provide causal evidence on the relationship between education and 
interethnic and interreligious tolerance. We use a unique large cross-sectional dataset with 
attitudinal data and show that an exogenous increase in education results in higher tolerance 
and pro-social attitudes towards individuals from a different religion and ethnicity. 
 
We provide evidence that moral education in primary schools under Suharto explains some 
portion of the treatment effects: cohorts born before 1988 were exposed to an indoctrination 
program by the Indonesian government that emphasized the unity of Indonesia and tried to 
lower both religious and ethnic cleavages. In addition, we emphasize important labor market 
mechanisms through which INPRES may have affected tolerance: individuals more strongly 
exposed to the program are more likely to migrate into cities, to work in trade and industry. 
These factors in turn imply that the religious and ethnic diversity of treated individuals is 
increased. Furtermore, treated individuals earn substantially higher incomes. 
 
This paper has important policy implications: it provides clean evidence on the endogeneity 
of preferences [5, 46, 33] to schooling. It shows that education has additional positive 
benefits in terms of increased tolerance in addition to well-documented benefits, such as 
increased citizenship and lowered delinquencies [41, 40]. It shows that education at school 
can substantially affect attitudes towards people from a different ethnicity and religion. This 
in turn implies that moral education at schools may be a viable tool for governments to 
increase cohesion among citizens. 
 
Future research should try to extend this work along two dimension: first, researchers should 
focus on understanding the exact mechanisms through which education affects attitudes. 
Second, researchers should test for the external validity of these results in a developed 
country context: For example, researchers could exploit exogenous variation in education in 
a developed country context (through compulsory schooling laws) to test for changes in 
tolerance and racism. 
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